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Abstract
Intercommunity dialogue encounters are a crucial tool for constructive conflict resolution. This research 
examines grassroots dialogue encounters with regard to the societal position of the participants, as 
well the situation ‘on the ground’ as influential to the transfer process. Interviews in Northern Ireland 
and Kosovo with community activists stressed the effectiveness of personal characteristics of dialogue 
participants when it came to transfer. Moreover, the readiness – affected by socio-economic conditions 
as well as external/secondary conflict parties – of the peer group to listen to its participant seemed 
fundamental. 
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When a society has suffered a protracted conflict, adverse parties do not easily 
reunite. Under the continued rule of violence, lives change tremendously and 
horrible crimes are committed. The question of how to extract a society from a 
severe and intractable conflict is addressed by post-conflict peacebuilding efforts, 
and is not an easy task. Immense obstacles face those who have suffered in the 
conflict and those who reach out beyond the front lines to try to establish a better 
relationship with the former enemy. One critical component of the complex 
peacebuilding process is dialogue or similar meetings between conflicting parties. 
These meetings take place on all societal levels, engaging political decision 
makers, as well as participants in civil society initiatives at the grassroots level. 
*) Katharina Ploss is a post-doc at the Department of Political Science at Bilkent University in Ankara. 
She has substantial practical experience with intercommunity dialogue in various locations across the 
globe, as well as online. 
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Ideally, the setting of a dialogue meeting allows participants to develop new 
ideas to address their conflict and find mutually acceptable areas of agreement. At 
the same time, the participants work on the improvement of their interpersonal, 
and thereby intergroup, relationships (Mitchell 1993: 79). Dialogue meetings 
can therefore offer a unique chance to address the deeds of the past and work 
together towards a joint future. Organizers, facilitators and participants usually 
pursue two aims, of which the latter group may be less overtly aware. First, the 
attitudes and perceptions among participants of the dialogue encounters should 
change. This means that positive change is expected to take place on the micro-
level, largely through interpersonal connections within the small group. Second, 
these positive changes should be transferred out of the dialogue meeting venue 
and into the constituencies and peer groups of the participants (Kaufman 2002; 
Mitchell 1981; Rouhana 2002). If the new insights are successfully passed to the 
peer groups, this may induce a change in attitudes on the macro-level of the com-
munity and subsequently in society, multiplying the scale of any positive out-
come and contributing to the overall peacebuilding process in the conflict area. 
Although the concept of “involve a few, reach many” is undoubtedly appealing, 
transfer of new insights from dialogue meetings to a wider audience is an under-
researched topic in the field of conflict resolution – even though the challenges of 
transfer processes are very prominent. Fisher (2005), one of the first and few to 
develop a model of transfer effects, suggests how information gained during 
Interactive Conflict Resolution meetings can trickle to political decision makers 
and public opinion.1 Studies of top-level conflict resolution encounters have also 
allowed crucial observations to be made: Chataway (2002), Fisher (1997, 2005), 
Kelman (1997, 1998, 2000), Rouhana (2000) and others pointed towards two 
factors that seem to affect the transfer process: 1) the position of the participant 
of the dialogue encounter among his constituencies and 2) the degree of tension 
‘on the ground’ which may prevent the participant from sharing any positive 
perception or information about the other conflict party with his peer group as 
the participant fears being punished for that. 
The how and why of the transfer process remains vague despite the prominence 
of cases like Kelman and Rouhana’s interactive problem solving workshops 
addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially during the phase prior to the 
Oslo agreement of 1993, in which the participants were able to transfer ideas 
from the workshop series upwards to the political decision-making level (Kelman, 
1998, 2000, 2005).2 Transfer processes are even more opaque when it comes to 
1) Fisher (2009) provides a comprehensive overview of the vast amount of dialogue meetings conducted 
in conflict resolution practice. He stresses numerous descriptions of these meetings between former 
adversaries and labels referring to these encounters. The names differ slightly but tend to refer to the same 
thing, such as Burton’s controlled communication, Montville’s track-two diplomacy, Azar’s problem-solving 
forum, or Chasin and Herzig’s facilitated dialogue. 
2) Transfer of changes is expected to happen upwards to political decision makers (Kelman, 1972), down-
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grassroots initiatives. Conflict resolution scholars like Fisher and colleagues have 
predominantly concentrated on meetings between elites or medium-level politi-
cal actors such as religious leaders. Hardly any attention has been paid to transfer 
processes from grassroots community activists to their peer groups, and little is 
known about how the community activists conceptualize the process of passing 
on information and insights. The primary goal of this article is to expand the 
knowledge of the transfer process to address gaps with regard to grassroots com-
munity activities. 
When it comes to information transfer, it seems worthwhile to look beyond 
the relevant conflict resolution literature to a larger theoretical umbrella: social 
influence. This allows the research question to be posed in social-psychological 
terms. What do community activists in Northern Ireland and Kosovo believe 
allow them to influence the opinions of their peers groups? What are the aspects 
that they consider significant for the transfer, i.e. the influence process? What 
may inhibit the activist’s impact on his peers? Apparently, information transfer 
from intercommunity dialogue can easily be seen as a process of social influence. 
The studies on social influence suggest various models how social influence 
takes place and what might prevent it. Martin and Hewstone (2003: 312) argue 
that social influence “refers to the ways in which the opinions and attitudes of one 
person affect the opinions and attitudes of another person.” For understanding 
the motives and concerns of the community activists, studies on minority influ-
ence on majority groups are particularly interesting (e.g. Moscovici, Lage and 
Naffrechoux, 1969; Moscovici and Personnaz, 1980): community activists and 
their presumably positive attitude towards the other conflict party, the outgroup, 
tends to be the minority opinion. The peer groups of the community activists, 
however, are inclined to hold an antagonistic opinion about the other conflict 
party. This hostile opinion is, on average, widely held in society and consequently 
qualifies for the majority attitude. Therefore, this study analyzes how a minority 
perceives its influence on a majority opinion. 
Kelman has been influential in developing concepts of social influence and 
applying them beyond the academic laboratory setting to real life conflicts. He 
distinguishes between three processes of social influence (1958): compliance, 
identification, and internalization. When a person complies, he accepts being 
influenced by another person because he expects to benefit from that or because 
he is afraid that he would be punished if the influence is not accepted. Hence, 
the person influenced changes his opinion to receive a reward or avoid punish-
ment, rather than because he believes in the message. Identification means that a 
person accepts the influence of another person because he wants to build up or 
preserve a “satisfying, self-defining relationship to another person or a group” 
wards to grassroots (Kaufman, 2002), or laterally between dialogue participants of different initiatives 
(Cuhadar, 2009). 
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(Kelman 1958:53). The last process of social influence proposed by Kelman is 
internalization. Here, a person accepts being influenced because the message that 
is transferred to him is in line with his personal value system. French and Raven 
(1968) picked up on Kelman’s distinction and elaborated on it. They suggest 
reward power (resembling Kelman’s compliance) and referent power (identifica-
tion, in Kelman’s terms). French and Raven further differentiate between coer-
cive, legitimate, and expert power. Coercive power is similar to reward power but 
upside down: a person accepts the influence of another person because he is afraid 
of punishment if he fails to adhere to that influence. A person influences another 
person through legitimate power when that other person accepts influence because 
he feels obliged to do so. Expert power is exerted when a person agrees to being 
influenced because he considers another person as having expert knowledge on a 
particular topic. This special knowledge gives that other person expert power. 
Then, according to social influence literature, what makes people listen to 
information transferred to them? Apparently, it matters significantly how people 
perceive the source, i.e. the person, of information and what standing or reputa-
tion that person is ascribed to by others (Cartwright and Zander 1968; Cialdini 
1984; Klapper 1960). Cartwright and Zander argue that a person who is very 
prestigious tends to be very credible for his peer group. Hence, his prestige allows 
him to influence others. What is more, the authors outline that members of well 
established groups exert a special influence on each other. Group members may 
try to model their behavior according to the behavior of a leader, hero, or any 
other person who has suffered for the group. Therefore, the leader or hero is able 
to affect other members of his peer group because these members are positive 
about this influence. The ideas and findings about the identification of the ‘influ-
encee’ with the ‘influencer’ put forward by Cartwright and Zander, French and 
Raven, as well as Kelman, seem to relate fairly well to Mugny and Perez (1991) 
and Turner’s (1991) suggestions on minority influence. Mugny and Perez claim 
that minorities affect others, when these others perceive identifying with that 
minority as congruent with a positive social identity. In Mugny and Perez’ take, 
minorities impact on others when the minorities are categorized as ingroup. This 
observation is in close line with self-categorization theory in which people iden-
tify with a particular group and conform to a prototypical group position (Turner 
1991). Turner, Wetherell, and Hogg (1989) described this type of social influence 
as referent informational influence. 
Moscovici et al. (1969) explain minority influence on majorities slightly differ-
ently. Here, the most cited factor for minority influence is consistency. Moscovici 
et al. argued that minorities need to act consistently over time in order to affect 
majorities, i.e. minorities would need to repeat the same answer or information 
again and again if they wanted to impact on the majority opinion. Nemeth, 
Swedlund, and Kanki (1974) extended this finding. They claimed that for a 
minority to successfully influence the majority, it should not necessarily only 
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repeat the minority position persistently but rather be very confident about their 
minority opinion. This way, majorities tend to focus on the minority point of 
view. Majorities might re-check their opinion and use the minority attitude as a 
stable focal point to which they can move. What is more, minorities should ide-
ally be part of the ingroup and be credible to other ingroup members (Clark and 
Maass 1988). Especially, source credibility seems to be important as Clark and 
Maass found that source credibility of the ingroup minority is linked with an 
intrinsic, private change of attitudes in contrast to an extrinsic, public one. Hence, 
people accept influence because they respect or admire the influencer, or find the 
influencer trustworthy and credible, or concur with his values. Besides, people are 
motivated to process information when they perceive the information as highly 
personally relevant (Petty, Cacioppo and Goldman 1981). People listen to infor-
mation and accept influence because they do not want to deviate from ingroup 
norms or because they want to have detailed knowledge about a particular topic 
(Deutsch and Gerard 1955) and have a solid need for cognition (Cacioppo and 
Petty 1982). 
In-depth interviews were conducted with community activists in Northern 
Ireland and Kosovo to shed light on the process of grassroots peacebuilding. The 
term “community activists” was chosen because the interviewees have been active 
within and across the community divide. The activity includes the facilitation of, 
and participation in, community dialogue groups or other related initiatives that 
focus on intercommunity relations, interface work in the case of Northern Ire-
land, working for an organization that addresses intercommunity relations, as 
well as mediation and mediation training work.3 Hence, the interviewees of this 
study have been in touch with the other community through a wide range of 
activities but the contact must not have necessarily taken place in the form of a 
formal dialogue group. The term community activist denotes that the person in 
question is actively engaged in intra- and intercommunity work. 
As a secondary outcome of the data gathered during the course of this research, 
insights obtained may be useful for practitioners, especially since the study ana-
lyzed actual cases in the field. Increased understanding of community-based 
exchange of ideas can add significantly to the literature on transfer from dialogue 
encounters, and might be of significant help for practitioners in the design of 
their interventions. Increased knowledge about what makes a successful transfer 
process can allow facilitators to set up their initiatives accordingly, and may help 
to improve future encounters between communities in conflict. 
3) Interfaces refer to areas in Northern Ireland where Catholic and Protestant areas or estates neighbor 
each other directly. Interface areas tend to be flashpoints at which violent clashes between the communi-
ties still occur fairly frequently. Walls and fences demarcate the borders between the Catholic and Protes-
tant areas. Infamous examples of interface areas are the Alliance Avenue in North Belfast or the Fountain 
in Derry (Heatley, 2004).
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The lack of information on transfer from community activists’ perspectives is 
unfortunate because the grassroots constitute the most numerous societal level. In 
addition, grassroots initiatives as part of an emerging civil society sector can play 
an important role during post-conflict peacebuilding (Belloni 2001; Peck 1998; 
Pouligny 2005). The minds and hearts of the people on the grassroots level, how-
ever, cannot be won over by law or by political decree. Peacebuilding processes 
tend to be more effective if initiatives and ideas are not only introduced from the 
top-down, i.e. from policy makers to grassroots (Lederach 1997), but also involve 
a change in attitudes coming from the people themselves. This is what makes 
cross-community encounters so valuable and this is why learning more about the 
transfer strategies of community activists is so crucial: if changes that occurred 
during the encounters are passed on to the entire peer groups of the participants, 
members of the peer groups may change their attitude as a result of what they 
have learned. Bottom-up approaches therefore can add significantly to top-down 
methods and policies which aim at sustainable peacebuilding. 
If people on the community level change their attitude towards the other con-
flicting party this can: 1) help policy makers to implement already intended con-
ciliatory gestures or 2) can press policy makers to consider making conciliatory 
gestures. In addition, policy makers themselves may be pressured to alter their 
opinions if they do not want to lose their constituencies. Admittedly, dialogue 
meetings are just one tool among many others that may trigger this transforma-
tion in attitudes, and the meetings can only initiate this alteration among a 
broader audience if the positive changes which occurred during the dialogue 
meeting are actually passed on to the peer groups of the participants. If the new 
insights remain with the small group of the encounter, the multiplier effect will 
not be realized. Hence, it is of utmost importance to gain comprehensive insights 
into how people who engage in cross-community encounters on the grassroots 
level understand the transfer process. According to Lederach (1997), people on 
the grassroots level face the most fundamental challenges during the post-conflict 
peacebuilding phase. These include issues of security, shelter, and other basic 
needs and for them it might be most challenging to leave behind the deeds of the 
past and look towards a better future in which they might live in mutual accep-
tance with a group of people who had previously done harm to them. Conse-
quently, it seems most appealing to understand how transfer processes work 
on the grassroots level. People who engage in cross-community encounters are 
expected to face particularly demanding challenges, as their peer groups have 
suffered enormously in the conflict. These community activists might then 
approach the transfer process differently than has been observed for transfer pro-
cesses at the top-level. 
This article shows that community activists consider two aspects center stage 
for the transfer process to their peer groups: first, their personal credibility among 
their peers and second, the readiness of the peers to listen to messages coming 
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from their activists. Both factors are highly interdependent: if the community 
activist is perceived as credible by his peers, it is easier for him to reach out to 
them and pass information on. However, the peer group needs to be ready for 
that process. If the peer group is not ready for a variety of reasons explained in 
detail throughout the article, it tends to be very challenging for the activist to be 
heard by them. The results of the study relate well to prominent findings on social 
influence processes outlined above: peer groups seem to accept the influence of a 
community activist if they perceive the activist as credible. Furthermore, the peer 
group needs to be motivated to process information transferred to them and 
thereby allow the influence to happen. Hence, the information transfer from 
community activists to their peer groups is clearly a process of social influence. It 
needs to be stressed that this study does not aim at examining to what extent the 
messages of the community activists were absorbed by their peers. Even though 
this might limit the scope of this study on the one hand, it makes the findings and 
conclusions presented here more robust, on the other hand. To assess the extent 
to which the messages were recognized by the peers, it seems advisable to investi-
gate the opinions of the peer groups. However, this type of inquiry would need a 
different set-up and potentially a significant budget in order to be thoroughly 
conducted. 
Rationale and Conduct of the Research
This article was intended to investigate how people who engage in intercommu-
nity encounters construe the transfer of changes and messages from the initiatives 
to their peer groups. Even though social influence literature might suggest factors 
beyond the ones mentioned by the interviewees – nothing was said about a need 
for cognition, for example – it was the rationale of the study to present the view-
point of the interviewees. It was anticipated that this way the reality on the ground 
in the communities in Northern Ireland and Kosovo would be most adequately 
and correctly reflected. The second aim of this project was to offer insights that 
would be relevant to policy practitioners. Lepgold and Ninic (2001:35) state: 
“knowledge is policy-relevant if it addresses the instruments, context, and/or con-
sequences of policy.” 
In-depth interviews were conducted in Northern Ireland and Kosovo with 
people who engage in cross-community work. It was anticipated that the cases of 
Northern Ireland and Kosovo would offer in depth knowledge about the “appear-
ance” of the transfer process. Northern Ireland and Kosovo are in a post-conflict 
peacebuilding phase and, in both cases, the interviews focused on people who 
engage in various ways in cross-community encounters and/or relationship devel-
opment. The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland was signed in 1998, 
while the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established in 1999, 
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with a new outbreak of short-term violence in March 2004. Kosovo declared 
independence in February 2008. Both cases are located in Europe, with Northern 
Ireland in the North-West and Kosovo in South-East of the continent. The differ-
ing locations potentially would offer some culturally specific aspects to the under-
standing of the transfer process. 
One of the major differences between the two cases has been the role of inter-
national actors on the top political level. Northern Ireland has attracted enor-
mous international attention among politicians and scholars. Despite this interest, 
Northern Ireland was always predominantly perceived as problem internal to 
the UK, in which the international community would not interfere (De Chaste-
lain 2003; Stevenson 1996). In addition, it seemed unlikely that the conflict in 
Northern Ireland would seriously threaten the security of the rest of Europe 
(Cox 1998). Moreover, Northern Ireland has been part of one of the most power-
ful and highly industrialized countries in the world, making it unlikely that 
the US or any country of the European Union would try to influence the govern-
ment in London to address the conflict in her Northern province (Dixon 2002). 
Recommendations or lobbying appear probable, but anything beyond words is 
doubtful. When the British government allowed the US envoy George Mitchell 
to engage Northern Ireland in the early 1990s, he was not there to make decisions 
or to give directions on how to tackle the conflict between Catholics and Protes-
tants (Curran and Sebenius 2003; Curran, Sebenius and Watkins 2004). Interna-
tional political actors intervened in Northern Ireland with different means and to 
different extents than in Kosovo. It was unlikely to expect any large scale violence 
of British security forces against Catholics in Northern Ireland, as was the case of 
Milosevic and his actions against Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo given that Peter 
Brooke, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland claimed in 1990 that 
Britain had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland” (Brooke 
cited in Dixon 2002). 
Elsewhere Dixon (2001) has argued that the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 
showed that the Britain had understood fairly early that there was no military 
solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the urgency for the inter-
national community to intervene in Northern Ireland was not the same as in 
Kosovo. In Kosovo, international political actors have resumed a prominent 
role (Kuperman 2008). After NATO air strikes, the international community 
established UNMIK as an interim administration of the region. In contrast to 
Northern Ireland, local actors played less prominent roles than international 
actors, such as the European Union, the US, Serbia, Russia, the NATO or 
the UN. The international community was far more involved on the political 
scene, becoming an active actor on the local level rather than simply a third party 
trying to get the warring parties to the negotiation table (Yannis 2001). When it 
comes to political decision-making, therefore, the international community has 
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formed a much closer relationship with Kosovo than with Northern Ireland, the 
integrity of which within the United Kingdom was never challenged on the inter-
national level. 
The international community might have been involved differently in political 
decision-making processes in the two cases, but international donor agencies and 
NGOs have been equivalently very active in Northern Ireland and Kosovo. The 
community sector in Northern Ireland received considerable funding from the 
late 1980s onwards, with the International Fund for Ireland, started in the mid 
1990s, garnering donations from the US, Australia, New Zealand and other areas 
as well as the PEACE programs of the European Union. More specialized NGOs, 
and the increasing number of women’s organizations, pointed towards further 
expansion of the community sector (Birrell and Williamson 2001). In Kosovo, 
many prominent international organizations, like CARE International, UNDP, 
OSCE, Partners for Democratic Change, and other smaller international NGOs, 
began to engage in intercommunity relationship development work in a variety 
of capacities. The interviews, as well as field stays, revealed that the people on the 
grassroots level had experienced numerous attempts to post-conflict peacebuild-
ing in their areas. 
Interview Partners Northern Ireland
In total, 17 people from Northern Ireland participated in this study (9 from the 
Catholic and 8 from the Protestant community/ 7 female and 10 male intervie-
wees). The interviewees had been engaged in intra- and intercommunity work in 
Northern Ireland for decades. The type of engagement varied from altruistic sup-
port of the community, through campaigning for and establishing integrated 
schools, to violent actions in paramilitary organizations. Today, the interviewees 
work in various branches of the community sector: publicly funded community 
organizations, community centers, as volunteer community activists, free-lance 
dialogue practitioners, scholars, or as political advisors. Generally, it should be 
highlighted that all interview partners in this study are currently engaged in a 
number of types of activities and different encounters within and across their 
communities. It is often difficult to track down the exact initiative or activity in 
which the interviewees have participated that is the major source of positive mes-
sages being transferred back to the peer groups. It therefore seems more reason-
able, and better supported by the available data – particularly for this article – to 
assume that the interviewees have been influenced through a number of their 
associated activities. The interview partners were not just involved in a single 
project, but rather joined different initiatives or engaged with the other commu-
nity members in a non-structured and private way. Moreover, all interviewees 
share a basic willingness to engage with the opposing community. 
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Interview Partners Kosovo
In the Kosovo case study, two different groups of interviewees participated. In 
total, it was possible to speak with 18 people in in-depth interviews (15 from the 
Albanian and 3 from the Serbian community/ 4 female and 14 male interviewees).4 
The first group consisted of interviewees from the municipality of R., who were 
former participants in a dialogue/workshop series that was conducted by a small 
international NGO from December 2005 until April 2008. Most of these inter-
view partners had been involved in the municipal government and administra-
tion of R. In addition to their official functions in the municipality, some of the 
interviewees engage in farming and wine growing, both of which are typical for 
that rural area of Kosovo. One of the interviewees was a Serbian policeman, based 
in one of the Serbian enclaves in R. Another interviewee worked for a NGO 
focused on addressing the needs of the handicapped. A third interviewee was the 
local imam. The interview partners had been invited to participate in the workshop 
series, together with fellow members of the municipal administration/government. 
Most of the interview partners in this group have tried to keep in close contact 
with their fellow participants of the workshop series. Due to their work for the 
municipality, most of them continue to see each other on a regular basis. 
The second group consisted of interviewees who have been engaged in – broadly 
stated – intercommunity development activities. One interviewee works for a 
nongovernmental organization that provides a variety of services, ranging from 
mediation to conflict resolution training, as well as gender- and ethnicity-equality 
awareness initiatives. Two other interviewees have been involved with two differ-
ent organizations that focus on women in conflict zones, and in particular on 
women’s empowerment and equality. A fourth interviewee works for a large inter-
national organization in Kosovo. This interviewee was involved in a special activ-
ity by that organization that concentrated on civil society development and 
intercommunity dialogue in Kosovo. 
Perceptions and Understanding of Community Activists
The aim of this article is to answer the question of what causes idea transfer to a 
wider community from a community activist’s perspective. The analysis of the 
data revealed two key aspects. From an intercommunity activist perspective, the 
transfer process is determined by: 1) credibility of the activist and 2) readiness of 
4) The proportion of each ethnicity reflected the overall distribution of ethnic groups in the population 
of Kosovo to some extent: in 2006 the Statistical Office of Kosovo issued that 92 % of the population 
were Albanian, 5.3 % Serbian, 1.1 % Roma, 0.4 % Turkish, and 1.2 % members of other ethnic groups, 
with a total of 2.1 million inhabitants in Kosovo (Lantschner 2008: 453; Statistical Office of Kosovo 
2008: 11). Unfortunately, no Roma representative was available for an interview.
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his peer group to listen to the messages that are intended to be passed on to that 
group.
It also became apparent, however, that the meaning and implications of the 
factors differ on certain dimensions across the two cases. For example, the data 
disclosed different perspectives on what evokes credibility: it can be engagement 
in a paramilitary organization, which proved to the group the willingness to pay 
the ultimate price for the cause of the community (as argued in Northern Ire-
land), or it can be induced through a clean personal record of no engagement in 
a combat group (as claimed in Kosovo). This observation stresses the manifold 
way that credibility takes hold. This exploratory research project offers an initial 
consideration on the process of transfer on the grassroots level, which had not yet 
been developed. Fig. 1 provides a schematic overview.
The model of transfer, as depicted in Fig. 1, postulates that transfer is more 
likely to happen if the community activist enjoys high credibility among his peers. 
High credibility ensures that his peer group listens to him because the activist 
seems sufficiently trustworthy. Credibility arises from numerous factors: personal 
suffering, a personal history of dedication to the community, as well as a position 
of authority. Transfer, however, does not depend solely on the credibility of the 





















Fig. 1. A social influence model of transfer by community activists on the 
grassroots.
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information that is intended to be passed on needs to fall on fertile soil, otherwise 
the transfer process fails. Hence, both credibility and readiness are intertwined 
and interdependent if the transfer process is to be successful. Credibility of the 
activist is crucial but not sufficient on its own; readiness of the peers to listen does 
not lead to a functioning transfer process alone if the person who passes on infor-
mation is not perceived as credible by the peer group. The model of transfer 
shows that the process requires both factors; the implications and interrelation of 
these two key factors are explained below. 
Credibility of the Activist 
The key factor “credibility of the activist” originates in the many personality traits 
that were mentioned by the interviewees as decisive for their ability to reach out 
to their peer groups. What appears to be particularly striking is the different per-
ception of paramilitaries and how being affiliated with a paramilitary organiza-
tion seems to induce or hamper credibility. In Northern Ireland, it was argued 
that peers tend to listen to those activists who themselves fought and suffered 
during the Troubles: “They speak the same language and that sounds like a cliché 
but they talk the talk and they walk the walk. They demonstrated that they were 
willing to pay the ultimate sacrifice” (Pa., personal communication, April 10, 2008). 
Mi. from a community organization in Derry emphasized the observation that 
people with a record of personal suffering in the name of the community can 
leverage this when it comes to transfer of positive insights and attitudes: 
What gives people credibility on the other side is their own reputation within their own community. 
Now this works on two levels. People who are ex-paramilitary now working in their community 
have a lot of clout within their community. They are very effective in trying to prevent young people 
to go through what they have gone through (Mi., personal communication, April 17, 2008).
When it comes to Republican community in Northern Ireland, the interviewees 
assessed the role of former paramilitaries fairly positively. Elsewhere Mi. high-
lights the different attitudes toward former paramilitaries in the Catholic and the 
Protestant community respectively: 
The Catholic community has accepted paramilitary prisoners. This is not saying that they are all 
accepted with open arms. But there is more acceptance of paramilitary people coming back and 
working with communities than there has been with the Protestant communities with their loyalist 
prisoners. They find it more difficult to re-integrate back into their community. There is a crazy 
mindset on all of this and that is, within the Protestant mindset, if you break the law you are a 
criminal. You shouldn’t have been doing what you are doing, bla, bla. And therefore you become 
that outcast (Mi., personal communication, April 17, 2008).
Apparently, then, credibility with the constituencies makes the community activ-
ists appear trustworthy. Pa., a scholar in Northern Ireland, convincingly argued 
that people who engaged in the paramilitary organizations were willing to give 
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up everything for the sake of the community. It seems understandable that con-
stituencies then tend to follow the recommendations and opinions of those key 
leaders – they have seen it and they have been through it all. Hence, in Northern 
Ireland, and especially in the Republican community, when a community activist 
was involved in a paramilitary organization, this activity can make him highly 
trustworthy and credible. This observation might be – to some extent – linked to 
findings on the role and perception of Palestinian suicide bombers in the Palestinian 
public opinion (Mishal and Sela 2000). Moghadam (2003), for example, argues 
that suicide bombing elevates the perpetrator’s status once the attack was carried 
out. The social status of the suicide bomber’s family increases as well. Taarnby 
(2003) takes a similar stance when he claims that following the terrorist logic, 
dying as a martyr places him above anybody else in the community, i.e. raising his 
social status. 
This is not to say that a community activist, by any means, needs to have a 
paramilitary background to be credible. Indeed, many interviewees were never 
involved in a paramilitary grouping but are committed to their communities 
in the long-term. These community activists might have supported community 
development through peaceful means. Mi. from Derry is a very good example of 
this. In the late 1960s he was the victim of an IRA bomb attack in his then work-
place. This certainly traumatic experience triggered his willingness to prevent 
individuals in the communities from killing each other, and he sought profes-
sional training to become actively involved in the community sector: 
I think from my own record and my own reputation, I have a certain amount of credibility but not 
with everybody. There are some people that want my name not even to be mentioned in the room 
or tell people that they are working with that guy or whatever because people have their own agen-
das. For me, I’m a straight talker, say it as it is but I’m also someone who can be trusted (Mi., per-
sonal communication, April 17, 2008).
Similarly, Je., a Protestant community worker who has been engaged in the field 
for 35 years states:
But now I must say a lot of years now I’ve got tremendous support from this community and 
from the Catholic community as well. So, what I think is that they see where you are coming from. 
They see that you are not doing it for yourself but that you are genuinely promoting the area to 
support the young people and also to support the whole community ( Je., personal communication, 
April 7, 2008). 
Unlike in the interviews in Northern Ireland, former paramilitaries from the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and more precisely the potential they might 
have, were not mentioned by any of the interviewees in Kosovo. Rather, the inter-
viewees seemed to stress that it is their clean personal record that helps them to 
pass on the idea of cooperation that they have gained through their engagement 
in intercommunity dialogue. As one of the Albanian interviewees from R. stated: 
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“They know that I’m sincere and that I never cheated on them” (Is., personal 
communication, September 22, 2008). Another Albanian interviewee who works 
for a large international organization in Pristina describes it similarly:
I don’t know, there are many, many reasons why somebody would listen to you, whether you have a 
clear dossier behind you, whether you will are really clearly known within your community as a 
righteous one, or because you’re doing something good, or you have managed something for differ-
ent reasons. For me it was easy to reach any community because I have no files, no records, nobody 
remembers me as somebody taking sides (Bu., personal communication, September 29, 2008).
Even though it was not explicitly stated by the Kosovo interviewees, it might be 
the case that former paramilitaries, or indeed anybody who has been involved in 
violent (para-) military activities during the war, is stigmatized. It seems possible 
that war activities and combat operations – albeit for the ‘cause’ of the Albanian 
community – do not necessarily lead to social ingroup prestige. Indeed, as one of 
the private conversations with a regional coordinator of a small international 
NGO showed, many people joined the KLA for material benefits and not out of 
ideological reasons. Today, therefore, the communities do not see former para-
militaries as heroes who were willing to sacrifice for the good of the larger group. 
Rather, they perceive them as criminals who tried to profit from the war. Further-
more, the KLA lost out tremendously in the eyes of the people due to their actions 
in the post-war period. During this time, they acted as henchmen for those who 
paid them, and intimidating and killing indiscriminately. Moreover, they looted 
Serbian property and ‘sold’ it, and anybody trying to impede them was threat-
ened, beaten, or even tortured. The fact that the interviewees did not refer to 
soldiers and paramilitaries as their identity group provides an insight into the 
facets of a successful agent of transfer in the case of Kosovo. 
It was remarkable that Northern Irish community activists tended to be more 
self-aware than their counterparts in Kosovo. This observation can be explained 
in the following way: it might be that the interviewees in Northern Ireland are 
formed or affected by a more individualistic culture, in which the individual and 
the role of the individual in society is more dominant than the collective. In 
Kosovo, on the other hand, the interviews might be influenced by a collectivist 
culture, in which the individual submits his will under the will and norm of the 
collective (Paez, Martinez-Taboado, Arrosspide, Insua and Ayestaran 1998). Tri-
andis (1995, 2000) confirms and elaborates that in collectivistic cultures; people 
prioritize ingroup goals over individual goals and form their behavior and actions 
according to ingroup norms instead of their own attitudes and convictions. This 
latter aspect has also been shown by Abrams, Ando, and Hinkle (1998), as well as 
Suh, Diener, Oishi, and Triandis (1998).
In a more individualistic society as Northern Ireland, the individual intervie-
wee might assess himself as more influential and ascribe himself a fairly promi-
nent role in the transfer process. In a collectivist society such as Kosovo (at least 
 K. Ploss / International Negotiation 16 (2011) 319–346 333
in comparison to Northern Ireland), the individual activist might not perceive his 
personal contribution as decisive; rather, it is the constitution of the peer group 
(ready to engage and to improve community relations), as well as other external 
aspects like the socio-economic situation, which affects the transfer process. This 
is not to say that interviewees in Kosovo neglect their personal role and the impact 
of their credibility entirely, it is just less prominently presented in the interviews. 
To challenge this explanation, one might argue that in collectivist societies the 
individual contribution of a person respected in the community could be signifi-
cant. The data validates this assumption. Indeed, if a respected person, like the 
head of a family or an imam, tries to pass on certain messages, they should be 
fairly successful. The imam participating in this study confirmed that his position 
of authority within the Muslim community helps him to reach out to the people: 
It is his position of authority that makes him credible and trustworthy. Still, it is 
no contradiction to the finding that the interviewees in Kosovo tended to con-
sider their personal contributions less central. Even if a person has a position of 
authority, his individual contribution might be limited if other aspects are more 
influential. In addition, a person holding a position of authority might continue 
to adhere to the norms of a collectivist culture: when asked about his personal 
role, he might be modest because he shies away from elevating himself over the 
collective. The finding that, obviously, not much esteem is given to former KLA 
members, does not come as a surprise when listening carefully to the interviews. 
At first glance, one might expect that in a collectivist culture such as Kosovo, 
combatants who seemingly fought for the community might enjoy a special sta-
tus. However, what needs to be considered is that the actions of KLA members 
are highly disputed and seen as very critical as outlined earlier. Unlike IRA activ-
ists who can be admired for their commitment to the cause of the community, 
KLA members are perceived fairly negatively and selfishly. Rather than fighting 
for the cause of the community, the interviewees suggested that the KLA was 
fighting for their own benefit. Hence, they did not serve the community and 
consequently cannot expect being treated with respect. 
What is more, interviewees in Northern Ireland might be more used to talking 
to foreign people about their personal roles in intercommunity relations. If they 
are more used to this, the interviewees might be more comfortable and self-
confident in analyzing their personal contribution to a phenomenon like transfer. 
It might also be the case that some interviewees in Northern Ireland emphasize 
their personal roles in order to stress how important it is to be from the area – to 
be someone who has experienced the conflict and suffered it in one way or the 
other. In a few conversations, some disdain resonated against people coming from 
outside and trying to fix things according to the book. This might be an addi-
tional explanation why some interviewees spoke eloquently about their personal 
role and how and why they believed their personal history has led to the credibil-
ity needed for the transfer process. 
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As a first step in the theoretical placement, the discovery of credibility as a key 
factor in the transfer process allows connecting the findings to the existing theo-
ries on transfer from interactive conflict resolution and comparable meetings 
on the top/medium political level (for example, problem solving workshops). 
Kelman (1972, 2002), as well as Ropers (2004), suggest that participants of inter-
active conflict resolution or dialogue meetings should hold an influential position 
within and be well connected to society, especially with regard to downward 
transfer. The findings for the transfer process on a grassroots level indicate a simi-
lar direction. Even though the aspect here is named credibility, it resembles Kel-
man’s and Roper’s idea of having a central position and being influential and 
expands that idea at the same time. The findings conclude that a person needs to 
be credible to influence the transfer process and consequently his peers. In this 
regard, the findings can also be linked to social-psychological research on leader-
ship and trust in leadership. Burke et al. (2007:611) found that “trust in leader-
ship results in behavioral and attitudinal outcomes.” They further argue that a 
high quality of leader-member exchange (LMX), as well as a good reputation of 
the leader, results in more trust. A low quality relationship between the leader and 
the members of his group, along with no prior relationship history between the 
two, leads to less trust (Burke et al. 2007:621). This research provides additional 
evidence for this observation and extends it. If the personal credibility of the com-
munity activist is high, constituencies tend to trust the recommendation of the 
activist more easily. Therefore, trust in the community activist occurs because of 
his personal history of community involvement. 
This finding provides insights into credibility as an important aspect for suc-
cessful transfer and provides concrete evidence of what accounts for credibility- a 
subject that was missing from previous studies on transfer. A person should have 
an influential position, but what exactly makes him influential? This research 
shows why credibility might be important and who would be a credible person to 
engage in an intercommunity project. This latter aspect might be of particular 
interest to practitioners, as it could provide important considerations in building 
cross-community encounters in different societies. The observations made on what 
makes for credibility and how this credibility allows community activists to reach 
out to their peers might as well be connectable to Max Weber’s thoughts on the 
three origins of legitimacy: rational/ legal authority, charismatic authority, and 
traditional authority. Weber argues that authority can be legitimized through a 
system of rational rules and if authority is executed along these rules. It is these 
rules people obey, not the individual executing authority. Hence, it is not per-
sonal authority. Charismatic and traditional authority, again, are personal accord-
ing to Weber. Here, authority derives from the charisma of the leader; the leader 
being a hero or a person with some supernatural capabilities. Personal authority 
can also originate in traditions or habits. People obey the traditional leader because 
it is common practice and habit to follow him. Particularly the latter two origins 
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of authority, charisma and tradition, seem relevant to the results of this study. 
Charismatic authority, for example, appears to be relatable to community activ-
ists formerly affiliated with a paramilitary organization, such as a former IRA 
combatant. Serving the cause of the community with all means and not shying 
away from the danger of lethal consequences, former IRA members possess 
charismatic authority. They are, generally stated, perceived as heroes due to 
their actions and commitment. The concept of traditional authority strongly 
reminds of the status of the imam in the municipality of R. in Kosovo and how 
this position provides him with the necessary clout to reach out to his peers. 
As outlined earlier, the imam explicitly claimed that people in his community 
listen to him because he is the imam. It is this position that people traditionally 
respect and follow. 
Readiness of the Peer Group to Listen
While credibility is undoubtedly important, a second key factor – readiness of the 
constituency to listen – is also center stage. In both cases, readiness is attributed 
to a couple of aspects that constitute/affect the readiness of the peer group to lis-
ten to the activist. The basic idea is that if the peer group is not ready to listen to 
any kind of positive message developed during intercommunity encounter, the 
community activists faces major challenges in reaching out to his peers. Hence, 
the transfer process is jeopardized if the peer group is not ready. The data offers a 
lot to the development of a model of transfer on the grassroots level. The factor 
readiness was deduced from several themes, which were mentioned in either one 
or both of the cases. Three major arguments were identified in the analysis of the 
interviews: community traits, the socio-economic situation in the community, 
and the influence of secondary parties. Community traits are composed of several 
sub-aspects, which adds complexity to the theme. For example, the degree of 
conflict related trauma among the peer group, its trustfulness, whether they vehe-
mently claim to be ready for a change in intercommunity relations (as was men-
tioned repeatedly by Kosovar Albanian interviewees), being trapped in historical 
traditions, and whether the peer group seems to be tightly knit (potentially allow-
ing the concept: if you win over one, you win many). 
The socio-economic situation within the peer group on the micro level, and 
the wider community on the macro level, was strongly emphasized in both cases. 
This again is a very interesting finding as so far socio-economic aspects were not 
mentioned in the relevant transfer literature. The interviewees would speak about 
how high unemployment prevents people from thinking about issues of conflict 
resolution or community relation development. If economic concerns prevailed 
among the peer group, the interviewees were negative about the transfer process 
precisely because the readiness of their constituents to think about community 
relations was extremely limited. This positive correlation between the socio-economic 
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situation in the communities and the willingness of the communities to listen 
appears understandable. In Northern Ireland for example, if people do not suc-
cessfully pass high school, fail in the job market, and eventually become depen-
dent on public benefits, they have other – seemingly more urgent – problems. Pa. 
from Derry states: “It is inevitable that you have sectarianism if you live in a 
scarce society, there is no hope for you and you can see the economy taking off 
but it doesn’t affect you” (Pa, personal communication, April 10, 2008). 
Here, the interviewee emphasizes that failure to include communities in the 
economic development of the region fuels existing conflicts. This notion is 
reflected in another interview with two interface workers from Belfast: “The 
problem that exists is, the areas where we live in and work in see no benefit. The 
working class areas in Belfast and the North of Ireland don’t see any tangible 
benefits of the peace” (Se., personal communication, April 15, 2008).
Other interviewees confirm that economic development in the communities is 
desperately needed. Je. from a youth club in Derry argues:
But what we need, we need jobs. We need people to know that they will have a good quality of life, 
they wouldn’t get a proper wage. (. . .) Industry jobs, that is what they should be concentrating on 
because you see when young people have good jobs and good money their lives will turn around 
because they take a pride in themselves, they take a pride in their homes. And in that sense it does 
good to their health, they feel more healthy, they feel more like socializing with other people because 
through their jobs they meet other Catholics. They are going to meet people from the Polish and 
from the Chinese or whatever, you know what I mean? And the whole world is going to change. 
But until that happens, apathy is going to remain and it is still here (Je., personal communication, 
April 7, 2008).
Another interviewee underlines the importance of the types of jobs that are 
needed for the region. In addition to the numerous part-time jobs, which do not 
cover the expenditures of the employees, the interviewee elaborates:
What they need to do is, you see, if they don’t tackle the situation properly and create jobs, this must 
be our greatest investment. I give a chance to work . . . You see, tourism is mostly low-paid jobs. 
There are very few good paid jobs and an awful lot is part time and that is the reality here (Pe., 
personal communication, April 7, 2008).
Furthermore, jobs in the community sector may decline substantially as the fund-
ing of the European Union dries up by 2013. The lack of proper jobs in the area 
relates to other societal problems, such as substance misuse – particularly among 
adolescents and young adults: 
We are stuck up there in the interface when we should really use the time and tackle the effects of 
alcohol on what happens in our society. If we are up in the interfaces when young boys attack each 
other, we should go into the off-licenses, into the bars to see if there are any young people there that 
shouldn’t be in there . . . A lot of the problems in the North have now gone up and the people (actu-
ally) just want to live in peace. But a few drinks and they have their own interpretation of history 
and that’s where the danger and problems come from (Pe., personal communication, April 7, 2008).
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It seems worth considering why transfer literature has neglected the negative 
impact of the socio-economic situation on information transfer. One explanation 
might be that transfer studies have predominantly focused on top- or medium 
political level meetings. On these societal levels again, especially on a top political 
level, socio-economic problems might not be as relevant and of concern as for 
people on the grassroots. This in turn is an important insight: apparently, when it 
comes to the grassroots level, transfer processes are heavily influenced by the 
socio-economic situation in the communities as this affects the readiness of the 
peer groups to listen to any positive information about the other conflict party. 
When it comes to Kosovo, if there was a single idea to arise from the inter-
views, it would be the influence of Serbia on the Kosovar-Serbian population in 
the North of Kosovo and in the enclaves and how this influence impacts on the 
socio-economic situation in the country. Serbia has initiated a parallel structure 
in Kosovo – similar to the Kosovar Albanian structure before the war (Ukelli, 
2008). This parallel structure in effect constitutes a state within the state of Kos-
ovo. Kosovo Serbs have their own administration, schools, and health system, all 
of which are financed by Belgrade. Yannis (2003) alludes to the observation that, 
especially during the initial phase of UNMIK, the Serbian parallel structures pro-
vided more reliable services to their local people than did the international admin-
istration. This helped the extremists in Serbia and Kosovo to gain support for 
their stance: eventually they were more capable of helping their people than the 
international players. 
The incentive Belgrade offers is compelling. The interviews indicated that Bel-
grade dictates, or at least heavily influences, the ingroup norms within the Ser-
bian community: Kosovo is part of Serbia and any engagement in the official 
institutions of Kosovo implies the acceptance and legitimacy of these institutions. 
One Albanian interviewee from R. stated:
In the moment we achieved to engage the minorities into the institutional life then through the 
influence of Belgrade even though they didn’t want to, they retrieved themselves from the institu-
tional life (Ab., personal communication, September 23, 2008).
Another Albanian interviewee claimed that Belgrade assails the Serbian commu-
nities in Kosovo with propaganda:
Propaganda, political propaganda still disturbs the communication between Kosovar citizens. 
I’m not saying that this is not also on the Albanian side but on the Albanian side it is not institu-
tional, it is private from different individuals on the Serbian side it is institutional from Belgrade 
and in the institutional way they request the citizens of Kosovo (Is., personal communication, 
September 22, 2008).
The influence of Serbia on the Serbian community in Kosovo differs. There are 
apparently those community members who feel strongly affiliated with Serbia 
and who cannot and/or do not want to become part of the state of Kosovo. It is 
338 K. Ploss / International Negotiation 16 (2011) 319–346
not clear whether this group objects to Kosovo voluntarily, i.e. due to their per-
sonal convictions, or whether they become overwhelmingly affected by the sticks 
and carrots that Serbia applies to them. Most of the Albanian interviewees argue 
that the opposition of the Serbians is economically motivated, since they earn 
better money when working in the parallel structures. Some Albanian intervie-
wees, such as Fl. from a regional NGO in Kosovo, emphasize that the Serbians are 
pressured to adhere to social ingroup norms. People who deviate from these 
ingroup norms can face severe repercussions from their own community. This 
appears to be the case for Bo., a Serb from R. who works for the municipality in 
R. He seems to belong to the group of Serbians in Kosovo who see their future 
within this state. They try to integrate and become part of the structure. Bo. is 
apparently not challenged by his immediate constituency, like his family, but the 
wider community criticizes him for being engaged in the Kosovo institutions. It 
seems obvious that people like Bo. would need to be vehemently backed up by 
the Kosovo government.5 Indeed, this is a double-edged sword, as others might 
perceive this support as favoritism. Still, if Bo. is properly integrated and is able 
to get his message heard within the institutions, he can become a role model 
for other Serbians. Furthermore, it would show to other individuals that it is 
worth engaging in the official Kosovar structures. This might be an incentive for 
Serbians to turn away from the parallel structures provided by Serbia. Albanian 
interviewees perceive Serbia’s engagement in Kosovo as highly detrimental. Serbia 
supports a parallel structure for and within the Serbian community. The financial 
incentives provided by the parallel structures are appealing, particularly against 
the background of the tense economic situation in Kosovo and the lack of inte-
gration and participation of the Serbian community in Kosovo’s economy. 
The impact of the readiness of the constituencies to listen to messages that 
come from dialogue encounters on the transfer process has only been analyzed to 
a minor degree in the relevant literature. This holds particularly true when it 
comes to the assessment of socio-economic aspects by the interviewees and how 
these aspects interfere with the transfer process. Some ideas about tension on the 
ground have been provided so far – for example Chataway, Kelman (1997) or 
Rouhana (2000) – however, no study on transfer has provided a comprehensive 
list of factors or investigated in detail why certain conditions might affect the 
readiness of the peer groups to listen. This research provides insights into what 
might facilitate the tension and hostility between the communities, namely com-
munity traits, (trauma, ‘being stuck’ in historical traditions), socio-economic 
conditions, as well as the influence of secondary parties. In contrast to conflict 
5) Sasa Rasic, the Minister for Community and Return of the Kosovo government, is a prominent role 
model. He succeeded Slavisa Petkovic who was the leader of the Serb Civic Initiative and became minister 
in January 2005 (Tütsch 2005). Hence, Kosovo Serbs such as Bo. who try to integrate into the Kosovo 
society can refer to well-known cases of Serbian integration into the political affairs of Kosovo. 
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resolution research, numerous social-psychological studies have stressed that peo-
ple with strong ingroup identification are particularly eager to save their group 
from the threats and attacks of an outgroup, i.e. the opposing conflict party 
(Coser 1956; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hodd and Sherif 1961; Sherif 1966; Duckitt 
2001; Stephan and Stephan 2000; Bobo 1983, Doty, Peterson and Winter 1991; 
Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Esses, Jackson and Armstrong 1998; Esses, Dovidio, 
Jackson and Armstrong 2001; Stephan et al. 2002; McLaren 2003). Positive news 
about the other conflict party might be perceived as a threat. The following quotes 
from Northern Ireland serve as an example of the challenges posed by historical 
traditions: if people in the communities are caught in their beliefs and in history, 
it makes it difficult to reach out to them. They are just not ready, as these two 
exemplary statements highlight:
1. (. . .) some people are so entrenched in their beliefs about other people that they are not open to 
listening. There are people who do not actually hear because they are so entrenched. They believe so 
much that what they know is the truth about the other person. (. . .) But there are people who are 
not . . . and it doesn’t suit them to be receptive. They want to hold on to what they are, who they are, 
and to keep all of that. So it is not really [expression not understandable, author’s note] . . . they 
are not open to hear that some things might get different because, from their perspective or where 
they are at, it doesn’t suit (An., personal communication, April 21, 2008).
2. Every time you do that, it is against the knowledge of history and against the knowledge of their 
learned experience. And if they hadn’t have a practical experience with a member of the other com-
munity, all of their...and which is the other community are from history, are from narrative, are from 
experiences that are handed down rather than coming out from behind the barrier to take a look at 
the other side of the fence. (. . .) But as long as we are stuck behind the walls and barriers of 400, or 
600, or 800 years of history we haven’t got a future. You know, history shouldn’t be our benchmark. 
It shouldn’t be where everything gets stuck ( Jo., personal communication, April 7, 2008).
Thus, the interviews seem to strengthen the argument that those who identify 
strongly with their group reject anything that is not in line with their interpretation 
of history. This again implies that people whose ingroup identification is strong 
are less ready to listen to the idea of cooperation with the opposing conflict party. 
When it comes to the transfer process on a grassroots level, the research offers 
more substantive insights into how the situation of and within the peer group 
affects the process of passing on certain messages. It became clear that “readiness 
of the peer group” describes a complex interplay of the various aspects better than 
a factor named ‘tension on the ground.’ While tension on the ground can affect 
the readiness of the peer group, and through that hamper the transfer process, it 
is more than just tension evoked by violent clashes that impacts readiness. This 
article has demonstrated how other aspects, like trauma or the economic situa-
tion, shape readiness. These findings are a major asset of the study because they 
comprehensively elaborate the crucial factors of the transfer process. 
Most importantly, the results blend in very well with findings on processes of social 
influence. The model postulated here confirms insights from social influence 
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literature and elaborates them at the same time at a tangible political level. It 
seems obvious that the transfer model is a model of social influence. As suggested 
by Kelman (1958), Clark and Maass, or French and Raven, credibility of the 
sender of the information is vital for social influence. The interviews highlighted 
exactly this aspect: community activists believe that they can affect their peer 
groups or are heard by their peers, if they, the community activists, are sufficiently 
credible, trustworthy, or in a position of authority like the imam in Kosovo. As 
outlined earlier in reference to Max Weber, the imam exerts legitimate power in 
French and Raven’s terms and affects people in his community by these means. 
The present study verified another essential aspect of social influence suggested 
by Moscovici et al. and Nemeth et al. Going back to what interviewee Je. from 
Derry said about her life-long dedication to cross-community relationship devel-
opment, that a minority needs to be firm and convinced in its opinion if they 
want to affect the majority. Je. or An. might not have been actively involved in the 
violent resistance and did not gain credibility through that. Still, they have pro-
moted an inclusive and integrated Northern Irish society for decades, despite the 
challenges they had to face. It seems legitimate to assume that these interviewees 
affect their peers because of their stable commitment to their personal conviction. 
This research extends the findings on social influence to actual conflict resolution 
tools and processes namely transfer from intercommunity encounters. The analy-
sis of the interviews in Northern Ireland and Kosovo shows that the mechanisms 
of social influence are certainly not constrained to experimental settings. This 
study did not only confirm the importance of source credibility as put forward 
in social influence literature, but also stressed the impact of the recipient’s 
motivation to be influenced. Particularly this latter aspect – the recipient’s moti-
vation – is a factor that has been long promoted in social influence literature but 
that has received only minor attention in conflict resolution transfer studies. 
This research confirms the enormous significance of the recipient’s motivation 
as proposed in social influence studies and recommends putting it center stage 
for understanding transfer processes. 
Social influence scholars like Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman or Deutsch and 
Gerard pointed out that recipients of influence/information need to be motivated 
to process that information. Otherwise, the social influence process fails. The 
present study validates these thoughts excellently. If the peer groups of the 
community activists are not ready for various reasons, i.e. not motivated to 
listen to ideas passed on to them by their community activist, the transfer process 
falls short. The interviewees particularly emphasized external aspects that affect 
the motivation of the peer groups to listen to their messages. The socio-economic 
situation in the communities was key in this regard and cannot be overestimated 
for its effect on recipients’ motivations to process information. The dominance of 
the socio-economic situation in the interviews underlines again that the condi-
tions in the communities need to have top priority in peacebuilding processes. 
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It is social influence literature that teaches us how and why this is vital to con-
sider: if peers are to change their attitudes, they need to be motivated to process 
information. 
Conclusion
How do community activists construe the transfer process from intercommunity 
encounters? The transfer process on the grassroots level is affected by the credibil-
ity of the activist, as well as by the readiness of the community to listen to the 
activist. Credibility emerges through the actions and attitudes of the activist (for 
example, a history of suffering for the community and devotion to the commu-
nity). Readiness is affected by different elements, which either refer to commu-
nity traits (for example, traumatized or willing to engage), the socio-economic 
situation, or external parties such as Serbia. The transfer process seems particu-
larly dependent on the readiness of the peer group because the peer group needs 
to be motivated to process information. A community activist might be highly 
credible, but if the economic situation is too tense, the peer group might just not 
be ready to listen to him. Hence, the messages of a community activist about 
cooperation with the other side for example can affect his peer group, nevertheless 
he is dependent on the conditions among his peers and in the wider community. 
Still, even if the community activist does not reach out to his peers right away and 
change their perception about the other conflict party, he can add to changing the 
tones about the other side and the relationship with the other side. If the com-
munity activist voices his positive perception about the other, it gives raise to 
another image and discourse within his community. This again might not alter 
the public opinion immediately but having it out there and presented by a 
respected figure of the community can induce change in the long-run. 
What is more, the transfer model integrates very well to already existing find-
ings on social influence. The model confirms substantial aspects of social influ-
ence processes discovered in social-psychological research, such as the massive 
impact of source credibility on the side of the influencer or sender of the informa-
tion and the motivation of those to be influenced to process information passed 
on to them. This research adds to the social influence literature with a highly 
practical and politically relevant example. It also strongly suggests considering 
information transfer from intercommunity encounters as part of the wider field 
of social influence. 
The findings of this study suggest a number of policy recommendations. Policy 
makers and donor agencies should be looking for community activists who 
have sufficient credibility among their peers. It seems advisable to conduct prior 
investigations within the target area and community in order to identify adequate 
actors. Even if prior investigations may be time-consuming and possibly costly at 
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the beginning, it is anticipated that this initial effort will eventually pay off sub-
stantially. The ‘right’ ones, that is, most credible people within a community, will 
be much more successful at passing on messages from intercommunity meetings. 
The results from this research indicate who might be credible: a former paramili-
tary, someone engaged extensively in the development of his community, some-
one who has devoted himself to the community by helping out the weak, or 
someone with authority, such as a local religious leader (if religion matters to the 
people in the community). With regard to former paramilitaries or other former 
combatants, policy makers need to take into account the standing of the respec-
tive groupings within the community. The community might highly respect those 
who fought, or the community might despise them. To be sensitive to the par-
ticular context is, therefore, indispensable for practitioners. Practitioners are 
required to know the perspective of the wider community on controversial figures 
such as paramilitaries. 
Close cooperation with local organizations cannot be overestimated, especially 
for foreign donor agencies. As highlighted in this article, local ownership of peace 
processes of any kind is essential. Local organizations usually have resources and 
knowledge, which international organizations working in the field may lack. 
Locals can recommend funding of people or groups that might have already formed. 
The normal person on the ground tends to trust a local organization more than 
an international one. Therefore, local organizations can better reach out to the 
people because they talk the talk and walk the walk – a quality which internation-
als occasionally lack. Yannis (2003) outlines that “one should not overestimate 
the policing capabilities of the international community in a foreign terrain in 
which the population has a long and sophisticated tradition of clandestine activi-
ties and a widespread gun culture” (183). Yannis’ observation confirms that it is 
indispensable – particularly for Western peacebuilding/civil society activists – to 
thoroughly assess the realities on the ground before implementing any sort of 
policy. In addition, international agencies should take notice that their money 
supports the peace process and not Western advisers and NGOs, as criticized by 
Veremis (2005).
Nepotism might challenge the cooperation between international donor agen-
cies and the local organization, especially when local organizations promote par-
ticular people who benefit them personally rather than have professional relevance. 
If international donors establish a trustful and possibly personal relationship with 
the local organization, this might be avoided. The international donor would 
then not seem to be an abstract partner, there just to provide money, but rather 
the donor might be perceived as a partner that the local organization does not 
wish to betray. 
Practitioners and donor agencies can choose whom to work with and at whom 
to direct their resources. However, it is considerably more difficult, to affect the 
readiness of a community to listen to ideas derived from intercommunity initiatives. 
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The results highlight the complex interaction between the various aspects that 
affect the readiness of a community. A single donor agency can certainly not 
address the socio-economic challenges within a community because it is up to 
governments, international organizations, and enterprises to improve this situa-
tion. Governments need to provide a framework that allows the business sector to 
flourish. International organizations or foreign governments might need to finan-
cially support a conflict-ridden area, and enterprises need to be willing to invest 
in the area and employ local people. Moreover, if a community is still severely 
traumatized, there should ideally be mechanisms and processes that help the trau-
matized to come to terms with the past. Again, individual donors or practitioners 
might not have the means to provide these services. It is also recommended that 
practitioners try to cooperate with other practitioners. Specialized practitioners 
might engage in trauma related work and through that advance the readiness of 
the community. Practitioners may also lobby governments to develop programs 
that improve the socio-economic situation within the communities. Here, it 
might be advisable to inform large lobby groups about the situation in the com-
munities so that these groups can use this knowledge in their campaigns. Hence, 
with regard to readiness, practitioners are strongly advised to look for cooperation 
with other players. What seems most promising is to combine efforts. 
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